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 FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3812  
 INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2859  
 RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 8490  
 BT  
 S E C R E T BONN 01473

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
 TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, UR, GE  
 SUBJ: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH HORST TELTSCHIK: DEBRIEF  
 ON GROMYKO'S VISIT.

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: ON JAN 18, CHANCELLOR KOHL'S ASSISTANT, HORST TELTSCHIK, BRIEFED THE AMBASSADOR ON KOHL'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO EARLIER IN THE DAY. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT GROMYKO HAD COME ACROSS AS CAUTIOUS AND NON-AGGRESSIVE, BUT PROBED THE FRG HARD FOR DIFFERENCES IN POLICY WITH THE U.S. ON INF AND THE NATO DOUBLE-TRACK DECISION. GROMYKO GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN ESTABLISHING A GOOD DIALOGUE WITH THE KOHL GOVERNMENT, PERHAPS REFLECTING A SOVIET BELIEF THAT THE CDU WILL PREVAIL IN THE COMING ELECTIONS. ALTHOUGH GROMYKO SPENT A LOT OF TIME ATTACKING U.S. POLICY AND BEHAVIOR, HE WAS UNABLE TO SEPARATE THE KOHL GOVERNMENT FROM FIRM SUPPORT FOR U.S. AND ALLIANCE POLICY. THE KOHL GOVERNMENT IS CONVINCED THAT GROMYKO WILL LEAVE BONN WITH NO MISAPPREHENSIONS ABOUT FRG RESOLVE. END SUMMARY.

3. AT CHANCELLOR KOHL'S PERSONAL REQUEST, HORST TELTSCHIK, ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE, CALLED ON THE AMBASSADOR, TUESDAY EVENING, JANUARY 18, TO GIVE SOME INITIAL IMPRESSIONS OF CHANCELLOR KOHL'S THREE-HOUR MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO EARLIER IN THE DAY. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT CONTRARY TO HIS FORMER VISIT TO BONN IN THE FALL OF 1979, GROMYKO HAD BEEN UNEXPECTEDLY UNAGGRESSIVE AND CAUTIOUS IN HIS PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SESSIONS IN BONN. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT THE CHANCELLOR HAD THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT GROMYKO WAS

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PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN TESTING THE NEW FRG GOVERNMENT, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO ITS RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON. HE SAID THAT GROMYKO SPENT A GREAT DEAL OF TIME PROBING KOHL TO SEE IF THERE WERE ANY DISCERNIBLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BONN AND WASHINGTON ON INF AND THE NATO DOUBLE-TRACK DECISION. ALTHOUGH GROMYKO TOLD THE CHANCELLOR THAT HE WAS DISAPPOINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT'S FIRM SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE ALLIANCE, HE DID NOT TRY TO THREATEN OR PRESSURE KOHL TO ALTER HIS POSITIONS. TELTSCHIK SAID THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT GROMYKO NOW FULLY UNDERSTANDS FRG POLICY.

4. THE AMBASSADOR SAID IT WAS GOOD FOR GROMYKO TO KNOW OF THE CHANCELLOR'S FIRMLINESS BUT SPECULATED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOW ONLY WORK HARDER ON VOGEL AND BAHR TO MOVE THE SPD FURTHER AWAY FROM ALLIANCE SECURITY POLICY DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. TELTSCHIK AGREED THAT THAT WAS LIKELY.

5. TELTSCHIK REPEATED THAT GROMYKO'S GENERALLY RESERVED PUBLIC BEHAVIOR HAD TAKEN A NUMBER OF PEOPLE BY SURPRISE. ALTHOUGH HE HAD BEEN A BIT AGGRESSIVE DURING HIS DINNER TOAST THE FIRST EVENING (SEE BONN 1370), GROMYKO MODERATED HIS APPROACH CONSIDERABLY THEREAFTER. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT INDEED A NUMBER OF FRG JOURNALISTS HAD EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT OVER GROMYKO'S CALM AND CAUTIOUS PERFORMANCE DURING HIS PRESS CONFERENCE (BONN 1369), SAYING THEY WOULD HAVE MUCH PREFERRED A HARD-HITTING ATTACK WHICH MADE BETTER COPY.

6. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT GROMYKO ALSO LEFT THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS LOOKED FORWARD TO CONTINUING THE DIALOGUE WITH THE KOHL GOVERNMENT, ACKNOWLEDGING THE AMBASSADOR'S OBSERVATION THAT THAT REPRESENTED A GOOD "INSURANCE POLICY." TELTSCHIK SAID HE ALSO ASSUMED BY GROMYKO'S BEHAVIOR THAT THE SOVIETS EXPECT THE CDU TO WIN THE COMING ELECTION AND REMAIN IN GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT GROMYKO EMPHASIZED THAT DESPITE SOVIET DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE FRG OVER EAST-WEST ISSUES, THERE WAS A LOT OF ROOM FOR AGREEMENTS OF A BILATERAL NATURE. TELTSCHIK FOUND IT PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT THAT GROMYKO AT NO TIME THREATENED TO CURTAIL RELATIONS WITH THE KOHL GOVERNMENT TO PUNISH IT FOR ITS PRO-AMERICAN POLICIES.

7. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED TELTSCHIK IF HE WERE INFORMED ABOUT GROMYKO'S MEETINGS WITH GENSCHER THE PREVIOUS DAY (JAN 17). TELTSCHIK SAID THAT GENSCHER HAD TOLD THE CHANCELLOR THAT GROMYKO HAD CONCENTRATED PRIMARILY ON INF, TRYING TO CONVINCE THE WEST GERMANS THAT THE U.S. POLICY WAS DIRECTLY THREATENING THE SOVIET UNION. REPORTEDLY GROMYKO HAD SHOWN GENSCHER A DETAILED MAP

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SHOWING PRECISELY HOW THE UNITED STATE'S MILITARY HAD ENCIRCLED THE SOVIET UNION. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT THERE WAS NOTHING NEW OR UNEXPECTED IN GROMYKO'S PRESENTATION AND THAT HE HAD AGAIN ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCE THE FRG THAT THE U.S. HELD A ONE AND ONE-HALF LEVEL OF SUPERIORITY OVER THE SOVIET UNION IN NUCLEAR WARHEADS.

8. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE FOUND THAT POSITION RATHER DISINGENUOUS IN THAT ANDROPOV HAD IMPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGED

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A SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN HIS INF PROPOSALS. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT GROMYKO CONSISTENTLY TOLD THE FRG THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS INTERESTED IN AN AGREEMENT BASED ON "APPROXIMATE" BALANCE, NOT ONE NECESSARILY REFLECTING "ABSOLUTE" BALANCE. HE SAID THAT GROMYKO AGAIN CHARACTERIZED THE PROJECTED PERSHING II DEPLOYMENTS AS STRATEGIC WEAPONS IN THAT THEY COULD STRIKE THE SOVIET UNION. GROMYKO ALSO CLAIMED THAT WESTERN INF DEPLOYMENTS WOULD GIVE THE U.S. A "THREE-FOLD" WARHEAD SUPERIORITY OVER THE SOVIETS.

9. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT GROMYKO CLAIMED TO BE PARTICULARLY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE CHANCES FOR SUCCESS AT GENEVA, CLAIMING THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO PROGRESS WHATSOEVER AND WOULD BE NONE UNLESS THE U.S. INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO BE FLEXIBLE AND COMPROMISE. GROMYKO SAID THAT THE NATO DOUBLE-TRACK DECISION AND THE ZERO OPTION WAS A CLEAR EFFORT BY THE U.S. TO PUT THE SOVIETS IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION FOR IF THERE WERE NO PROGRESS IN THE TALKS THE AMERICANS WOULD, OF COURSE, PORTRAY THE SOVIETS AS THE GUILTY PARTY. HE IMPLIED THAT SUCH AN APPROACH REPRESENTED UNFAIR TACTICS.

10. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT GROMYKO HAD ASKED THE FRG TO RECONSIDER CAREFULLY AND FAVORABLY THE RECENT WARSAW PACT DECLARATION ISSUED IN PRAGUE. AFTER REPEATING THE ADVANTAGES HE SAW IN A TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION, GROMYKO SAID THAT THE SIGNAL GIVEN ON NON-FIRST-USE OF ARMS WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT. GROMYKO CLAIMED THAT THE WEST HAD PREVIOUSLY ATTACKED SOVIET PROPOSAL ON NON-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR NOT MENTIONING SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND NOW THE WEST WAS ATTACKING THE SOVIETS FOR ADDING CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO THEIR EARLIER EQUATION. THEN GROMYKO DISCUSSED BRIEFLY THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUMMIT BETWEEN ANDROPOV AND REAGAN, WITH KOHL FAVORING SUCH A MEETING IN THE BELIEF THAT IT MIGHT WELL INSTILL SOME IMPORTANT MOVEMENT IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

11. TELTSCHIK THEN RETURNED TO GROMYKO'S EFFORTS TO PORTRAY THE UNITED STATES AS AN AGGRESSIVE POWER BENT ON PRESSURING THE SOVIET UNION. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED TELTSCHIK IF IT WAS THE FRG VIEW THAT THE SOVIETS WERE SERIOUS IN MAKING SUCH A CLAIM. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT IT WAS HIS (TELTSCHIK'S) PERSONAL VIEW THAT THE SOVIETS FEAR THE U.S. MILITARY BUILD-UP PRIMARILY BECAUSE IT WILL GIVE THE U.S. THE ABILITY TO INTERVENE IN THOSE AREAS WHERE THE SOVIETS ARE ATTEMPTING TO EXPAND THEIR INFLUENCE. TO THAT EXTENT, THE SOVIETS SEE U.S. MILITARY POLICY AS DIMINISHING SOVIET MANEUVERABILITY. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE SOVIETS WERE PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO AVOID A SOLIDIFICATION OF U.S. POWER AND INFLUENCE IN EUROPE FOR THAT WOULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE SOVIET EFFORTS TO INCREASE SOVIET LEVERAGE IN WESTERN EUROPE. IN ADDITION, TELTSCHIK THOUGHT THAT A SUCCESSFUL U.S. EFFORT TO BLUNT SOVIET AMBITIONS IN THIS REGARD WOULD CAUSE THE SOVIETS SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES AT ALL LEVELS - ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGICAL, MILITARY AND POLITICAL.

12. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WAS SURE THAT GROMYKO HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE CHANCELLOR'S STRENGTH AND RESOLVE. TELTSCHIK AGREED SAYING THAT KOHL HAD GIVEN GROMYKO AN UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR PICTURE OF FRG POLICY AND THAT WAS OBVIOUSLY USEFUL. HE SAID THAT THE CHANCELLOR HAD ALSO ADMONISHED GROMYKO AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AGAINST LOOSE TALK ABOUT WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, POINTING OUT THAT WESTERN EUROPE WAS CLEARLY NON-MILITANT IN ITS BEHAVIOR AND INTENTIONS AND THAT SUCH TALK ONLY

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INCREASED SKEPTICISM OVER SOVIET MOTIVES. GROMYKO IN  
RESPONSE AGAIN ASKED KOHL WHAT THE FRG GOVERNMENT WOULD  
DO IF NO AGREEMENT WERE REACHED IN GENEVA. KOHL SAID  
THAT ALL OF THE PARTIES IN THE BUNDESTAG HAD AGREED WITH  
PREVIOUS CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AS TO WHAT MUST BE DONE IN  
THAT EVENT AND THAT WAS THE POLICY THE KOHL GOVERNMENT

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WOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE. GROMYKO SAID THAT THAT DID NOT  
RESPOND SPECIFICALLY TO HIS QUESTION. THE CHANCELLOR  
SAID THAT IT WAS HIS ANSWER ANYWAY. TELTSCHIK SAID  
THERE COULD BE NO DOUBT IN GROMYKO'S MIND THAT THE FRG  
WOULD HONOR THE NATO DECISION TO DEPLOY IF THERE WERE  
NO RESULTS IN GENEVA.

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